Systems for managing data are also problematic. All this means that attention to civilian casualty issues is post hoc and sporadic, driving the Pentagon's leadership to move from crisis to crisis without ensuring that solutions to problems identified during operations are implemented throughout the force. Staffing on civilian harm at the Pentagon and the combatant commands also suffers shortfalls. They received scant guidance on how deep to dig into an allegation, how hard to try to verify the reliability of a source, or what to do with conflicting cases. They were relatively junior officers with little formal training in evaluating such reports who learned on the job. Officers who staffed civilian casualty cells ( PDF) at the height of operations against the Islamic State processed hundreds of reports a day. That's why Austin's memo directs the Defense Department to improve how the military collects information related to civilian harm incidents.Īnother fundamental issue is resources. If someone assessed the risk to be low before approving a strike, why spend valuable time afterward looking for evidence you don't think is there? Because of this false confidence, the Pentagon too often has instead treated engagement with civilian organizations as a public affairs issue rather than an opportunity to improve its data collection. Relying solely on self-assessments runs the risk of confirmation bias. But incorporating external sources of information can help the military itself do better. This example highlights the military's propensity to dismiss allegations from the outside. Only after civilian organizations shared compelling evidence from the ground did the Defense Department acknowledge the casualties. But the military's aircraft couldn't see the civilians crushed within. The military, lacking video evidence, declared that reports of civilian casualties were not credible. forces bombed a school it believed that the Islamic State was using for military purposes. This can be done through on-the-ground investigations, by working through local military or government partners, or by engaging more extensively with nongovernmental organizations.Ī high-profile incident in Raqqa, Syria, is illustrative. Other times, commanders have found ways to conduct an investigation safely and effectively. military personnel to assess an incident in person is too risky. For example, airborne assets can often detect smaller incidents that involve civilians in open spaces, but they are less effective at assessing strikes on structures in urban environments. We reviewed both organizations' procedures and found serious flaws in the Defense Department's. For that same year, the Pentagon put ( PDF) the number at only 22. The conflict-monitoring organization Airwars estimated ( PDF) that 465 to 1,113 civilians likely died in Iraq and Syria in 2019 as a result of U.S.-led coalition military action. The Defense Department relies heavily on airborne assets that systematically undercount such casualties. Share on TwitterĬhange should start with the process for figuring out whether the United States has actually killed civilians. ![]() Like many good plans, the proof will be in the execution.īoth at the Pentagon and in the field, civilian harm issues are almost always a part-time, secondary duty-important to everyone but a priority for no one. Experience has shown that civilian harm incidents can undermine military missions (e.g., securing support from locals), as well as America's political objectives (e.g., post-conflict stability). Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin issued guidance ( PDF) on January 27 that pledges to improve and institutionalize the military's procedures on civilian harm, an effort that he characterized as a moral and strategic imperative. In a building where process drives everything from strategy development to screwdriver purchases, flawed institutional procedures for identifying what went wrong means the Pentagon continues to tragically repeat mistakes. As anyone with experience in large institutions knows, that's a recipe for good intentions with no results. ![]() Both at the Pentagon and in the field, civilian harm issues are almost always a part-time, secondary duty-important to everyone but a priority for no one. Our own congressionally directed review, conducted in 20 and released January 27, finds much the same. They also suggest that after civilians are injured or killed, the Defense Department isn't doing enough to learn from its own failures. war against the Islamic State, the revelations highlighted more than a broken process for planning and executing airstrikes. When the New York Times documented faulty intelligence and flawed procedures that repeatedly led to civilian deaths during the U.S.
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